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The recent jurisprudence of Hungarian apex courts based on changes inserted
into the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2011 and the provisions of the 2013 Civil
Code on “violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation” set a dangerous precedent
that could be broadly applied against critics of the government, aka the EU’s first
electoral autocracy. The present blog post critically analyses a judgment of the
Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) of March 2021, which is highly likely to produce a
chilling effect.
The Tóta W. / HVG controversy
The dispute concerns a short opinion piece entitled “Hungarians don’t steal, they go
on adventures” that columnist Árpád Tóta W. published back in 2018 in the online
version of the weekly Heti Világgazdaság (Weekly World Economics, HVG). He
blamed the prosecutor’s office for halting the criminal procedure in a corruption
case OLAF reported, against PM Orbán’s son-in-law and his company. The criticism
was embedded in the European context. The journalist urged EU institutions to
step up much more forcefully against autocratising states. He made references to
the use of EU money for purposes in violation of EU values, the slouch European
procedures which play into the hands of authoritarians, the EPP’s struggle to get
rid of Fidesz, the soft nature of OLAF findings, and in general the failure to use
dissuasive measures by EU institutions against backsliding governments. Nothing
different than what many of us argue on this blog and elsewhere, only written in a
much more entertaining manner.
The challenged part makes a parallel using some heavy irony. It discusses Hungary
in the 2010s, where all checks to limit governmental powers and prevent corruption
failed and only the EU, as an external form of militant democracy, could put a halt to
democratic decay and constitutional decline. Today’s Hungary is then compared to
Hungarian troops ransacking across Europe some 1,100 years ago. They were not
stopped by their ruler either, but it was Western Europeans, at the Battle of Lechfeld
of 955, who finally put a halt to the violent crimes committed by “stinky Hungarian
migrants” and “Hungarian bandits”. The last two expressions in quotation marks
were too much for two ordinary Hungarian citizens – represented by their lawyer, a
former MP of the right-wing radical Jobbik party – who filed a lawsuit against HVG for
having published a piece violating the “dignity of the Hungarian nation”.
The court of first instance found a violation of the Civil Code, the court of second
instance reversed the judgment, and finally the Kúria as the court of last instance
agreeing with the first instance court, determined the media outlet’s responsibility
for publishing the article at dispute. (Case number: Pfv.IV.20.199/2020/7, 24 March
2021. The full judgment is available here.) The Kúria obliged the defendant to
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remove the hurtful words from the publication and publish an apology, and awarded
the plaintiffs 400.000 HUF (1.100 EUR) for a violation of their personality rights.
The Kúria judgment
Let us have a look at the laws first. The Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental
Law inserted a relevant provision. According to Article IX (5), in force as of 1 April
2013, the right to free speech may not be exercised with the aim of violating the
dignity of various communities, including that of the Hungarian nation. Members of
the Hungarian nation can enforce their claims in court against hurtful expressions,
invoking the violation of their human dignity. Making use of this constitutional
authorization, the Civil Code of 2013 includes a corresponding provision in Article
2:54 (5) that can be directly referenced by plaintiffs in civil cases. 
The two legal provisions were criticised for their potential chilling effect and for giving
extra protection to powerful societal groups. Despite the controversial nature of the
provisions, the court could have protected freedom of expression (and common
sense). Instead, the Kúria justified its holding by a series of heavy mistakes in the
reasoning, violating freedom of expression. Explaining a joke is a painful exercise,
but let us make this sacrifice for the sake of the legal analysis.
1. The writing was about corruption in Hungary and the discontinuation of criminal
proceedings against government allies and oligarchs suspected to be in breach
of the law. Therefore, if anything, the Kúria should have assessed whether
the current government’s criticism violated the dignity of the Hungarian nation.
Just for the record: it obviously did not, since the criticism was directed at the
government, which cannot be equalled with the Hungarian nation – a deliberate
confusion often entertained by Fidesz politicians.
2. But the court still finds the link in a logical twist that is difficult to grasp: it holds
that the journalist “’extrapolated’ his hurtful government criticism to the whole of
the Hungarian nation, a community against whom he did not intend to exercise
criticism.” It’s like a magic trick: the journalist did and did not criticise and violate
the dignity of the Hungarian nation at the same time.
3. Just like government-criticism does not equal criticism of a whole nation,
criticism of Hungarian troops 1,100 years ago does not equal criticism of all
Hungarians back then.
4. Should we move to the parallel nevertheless, it is difficult to equate the mass
of roving Hungarians with the current Hungarian nation. Not least because the
nation state as a social construct came into being many centuries later. In this
light it is highly questionable whether the plaintiffs would have standing at all.
5. Let us now move to the disputed words specifically. The court rightfully noticed
that the word “migrant” had a pejorative connotation in Hungarian language,
however failed to explore who the responsible entity was for turning this
otherwise neutral term practically into a swearword. And even if it was a bad
word in the eyes of some Hungarians falling for the government’s anti-migrant
rhetoric and policies, the court’s role is not to reinforce existing prejudices. Most
importantly, the journalist was using the term in a neutral manner.
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6. Getting to the core of the criticism, the Kúria noticed that the use of the word
“migrant” had to be interpreted in the context of political criticism, and the
journalist intended to show a mirror to the xenophobic hate speech conducted
by the government. In this context, the court argues that the use of the word
“migrant” alone would still have fallen under the scope of free speech. But it
was this word together with its adjective “stinky” and the noun “bandits” that
was allegedly too much. And this is probably the weakest part of the judgment,
where the court “became very lost in the labyrinth of literary comprehension.”
The Kúria notices the political context of the speech when analysing the
word “migrant”. But it loses its own line of argumentation when it comes to an
assessment of the words “stinky” and “bandits”. Here the Kúria does not realise
the political context any more, and finds the words gratuitously hurtful.
7. In the Kúria’s view freedom of expression is not unduly limited, since only
two words needed to be deleted. Acting as a high school teacher reviewing a
student essay, the Kúria continued its misplaced assessment: “the substantive
content and the form of the speech were not in harmony”. This view disregards
how literary works, journalistic articles, humour or irony work.
A European consensus
Rule of law and fundamental rights decline is often justified by reference to an
alleged Central Eastern European alternative definition of the mentioned values.
But let me pre-empt such a claim by stating that the Hungarian understanding of
free speech up until recently corresponded to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) and the Strasbourg (ECtHR) case-law. The Hungarian Constitutional
Court (HCC) consequently protected freedom of expression as it should be the case
in democratic societies.
True, the constitutional landscape changed considerably with the insertion of
Article IX (5) into the Fundamental Law, but it should not be used as a pretext to
depart from the European consensus on freedom of expression. So far, Article
IX (5) Fundamental Law and the corresponding Civil Code provision had a very
scarce case law, but the jurisprudence is quickly evolving. The HCC interpreted
the provisions in two decisions in February 2021, and in one of them, criticising the
Polish abortion regime, again the dignity of the community – in this case the dignity
of the largest religious community in Hungary, i.e. Catholics – prevailed.
Due to the specificities of the HVG case discussed, we still insist that the opinion
piece of Árpád Tóta W. does not qualify as an impermissible expression, and that
the Kúria manifestly departed from the established Article 10 ECHR compatible
Hungarian understanding of freedom of expression.
Independence and accountability
One may wonder why the earlier rich and progressive free speech jurisprudence
changed for the worse in 2021, whereas the Kúria could have adopted a free speech
friendly judgment, even in light of the Fundamental Law and the Civil Code.
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Media capture and the limitation of journalistic freedom cannot be dissociated
from state, including court capture. Courts are not, but at the very minimum cannot
be seen as independent in Hungary in the public eye. (See e.g. the Sargentini
report triggering an Article 7(1) procedure against Hungary.) Commentators thus
guessed whether the captured judiciary fulfilled some real or perceived government
expectations. As the defendant’s lawyer stated, the judgment does not only overturn
30 years of constitutional adjudication in Hungary, but also complies with the
ideological preferences of the newly appointed President of the Kúria, who was
elected against the veto of the vast majority of the National Council of the Judiciary,
and thanks to some tailor-made legislative changes, a practice antithetical to the rule
of law. (For details, see Viktor Z. Kazai and Ágnes Kovács.)
As a response to the criticism, the same person, the President of the Kúria issued
a statement and “forcefully rejected every attempt questioning or destroying
judicial independence”. The statement seems to abuse the reference to judicial
independence to pre-empt both criticism of the government and that of courts loyal
to the government. Furthermore, the statement also misunderstands the concept
of judicial independence, which does not mean that judges are sacrosanct and
judicial decisions cannot be subjected to a public debate. Quite to the contrary:
judicial independence prescribes that judges are only subjected to the law. And
this goes hand in hand with judicial accountability, which again is there to scrutinize
whether judges are indeed only subjected to the rule of law. Judicial accountability is
meaningless if judgments cannot be debated.
The HVG may now turn to the HCC, which is seen, despite all evidence to the
contrary, in the case-law of the ECtHR as an effective remedy to be exhausted
before turning to Strasbourg. (See Szalontay v. Hungary, and the analysis by Dániel
Karsai). The HCC may sit on the case for years, as it often does, since no deadlines
are foreseen for deciding constitutional complaints, but sooner or later the dispute
will reach the ECtHR. And if so, the Good Lobby Profs would happily assist HVG on
a pro bono basis.
One can only hope that in the meantime Hungarian courts return to their earlier
well-established jurisprudence protecting freedom of expression and nobody will
remember the rights-limiting days of the Kúria, when the HVG is rightfully afforded
just satisfaction in Strasbourg.
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